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Vertical integration is a strategic option for a
company that aims to have direct control over its value
chain. With regards to digital platforms, vertical
integration as a strategy is, to an extent, paradoxical,
since platforms’ operating models are largely based on
external actors with whom the platform owners have
only an arm’s-length relationship. Many large digital
platform companies have pursued vertical integration
and research has been conducted on the subject, yet it is
often industry-agnostic and focuses on large digital
platform companies. We sought to identify the vertical
integration strategies of digital platforms in the
agricultural industry, as well as understand the firm-
and industry-level drivers behind them. The results
showed that these drivers impact vertical integration of
digital platforms, which occurs along the value chain of
a platform’s user groups and not solely along that of the
platform. Furthermore, digitalization and data open
new avenues for vertical integration.
1. Introduction
Vertical integration, which can be explained as
directly controlling the different parts of a company’s
supply or value chain, is one of the fundamental
strategies for business growth [1]. Although the core
idea of internalizing activities along a company’s value
chain is simple, the underlying managerial decisions are
highly complex, due to the involvement of numerous
interdependent factors [2]. Traditionally, vertical
integration has been applied and studied in the context
of industrial companies [3, 4], with one of the central
questions being how much of the company’s supply or
value chain should be controlled directly by the
company itself and what should be left for external
actors [5].
Digital platforms differ from traditional pipeline
businesses [6] in that they typically rely on external
actors to deliver key assets and create content, instead
of these processes being controlled by the platforms
themselves. Therefore, pursuing vertical integration in
the context of digital platforms poses somewhat of a
paradox, since platforms are often seen as an alternative
for vertical integration activities [7]. The key task for
governing digital platforms is to manage transactions
and contributions from third-party actors with which the
platforms only have an arm’s-length relationship [8, 9].
As a result, the platforms have only indirect and limited
control over these actors through platform governance
mechanisms [10].
However, many platforms engage in vertical
integration as they seek to grow and expand their
businesses. Several major digital platform companies,
such as Amazon and Apple, have pursued vertical
integration, through acquisitions in areas closely linked
to the functions of their own platforms [11, 12]. Such
expansions, however, are complex, as they occur in an
intertwined activity network and in a structure where the
direction of exchange is less linear than that in
traditional value chains. The key objective for vertical
integration (i.e. controlling the value chain), has also
been discussed in the existing literature on digital
platforms. For example, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson
[9] reported that, in addition to transferring design
capabilities, platform boundary resources function as a
tool for platform owners to control the
complementarities built upon the platform by external
contributors.
Overall, the subject of boundary-setting in digital
platforms (i.e. when and how to expand the platform’s
boundaries to new areas and functions) has attracted the
attention of researchers [13]. However, research on the
subject has mainly focused on major digital platform
firms such as Apple and Facebook. At the same time,
companies from more traditional industries such as
agriculture, which included pipeline businesses with
relatively clear supply and value chains, are also
increasingly developing and launching digital platforms
to support and expand their operations, as well as
diversify their business models [14, 15]. In these
industries, digital platforms are built on top of existing
value chains by both incumbents with established
market positions and start-ups entering the market.
As the extant research has primarily focused on
major digital platform companies, firm- and industry-
level factors influencing the vertical integration of





digital platforms have not been explored. The aim of the
present study was to fill that gap in the research by 1)
studying the vertical integration of digital platforms
within a specific industry and 2) including examples of
start-ups and incumbents. The agricultural industry is an
example of a traditional industry with evident industry-
specific characteristics, including well-established
value chains. At the same time, digital platforms have
emerged within the agricultural industry and are
creating new ways of delivering value to their
customers. The research question posed herein was as
follows: What vertical integration strategies are being
used by digital platforms operating in the agricultural
industry?
2. Vertical integration
Vertical integration is commonly defined as
substituting market exchange with internal exchange
[4]. While internal exchanges in manufacturing firms
are typically unidirectional and occur between
sequential pairs of internal activities [16], in digital
platforms that are characterised by large networks of
interdependent activities [17], internal exchanges can be
bidirectional and occur between a combination of
multiple non-sequential activities. This complexity
renders many of the internal exchanges unlikely to be
present at external markets; therefore, vertical
integration is more than just substituting market
exchange with internal exchange. In addition, it has
been previously reported that the exchange needs to
occur between activities that are dependent on each
other [1, 16], which are also referred to as unique
complementarities [18].
In this study, vertical integration of digital
platforms was defined as acquiring distinctive, unique
complementary activities under a company’s direct
hierarchical control and developing internal
transaction networks while substituting market
exchange. This definition emphasises the role of
complementarities rather than directly referring to
supply and value chains; that is because activities and
their complementary relationships have been identified
as an appropriate unit of analysis in the domain of digital
platforms characterised by networked activity structures
[18].
Strategic management research on vertical
integration has been shown to vary between firm-level
managerial aspects of vertical integration decisions [19]
and industry-level studies analysing the relationship
between vertical integration and specific industry
characteristics or practices [20]. While the
interdependence between the two approaches is
generally acknowledged in the literature, studies have
usually only focused on one or the other [19].
Digital platform research has focused on other
types of expansion strategies, such as platform
envelopment [12], and entry into complementary [21]
and new platform markets [22]. The focus of these
studies was primarily on horizontal integration, the
complementarities provided by external actors, entering
new markets or attracting more users to the platform.
2.1. Drivers of vertical integration
The extant economics and management literature
on the drivers of vertical integration can be divided into
three streams. The first stream is focused on efficiency
and grounded on the transaction cost and property rights
theories [3]. The main argument is that, by internalizing
the transaction, the related transaction costs are also
eliminated.
The second stream has focused on firm capabilities
that increase or limit a firm’s ability to perform certain
downstream or upstream activities. These capabilities
are understood as configurations of assets, resources and
activities [23] that create efficiencies and quality
advantages over other firms [24]. The capability
perspective suggests that vertical integration allows for
performance advantages by expanding opportunities for
systemic internal innovation and access to technology
and information [25]. However, it also simultaneously
risks foreclosing external innovation opportunities and
reduces strategic flexibility, as compared to relying on
the market-based capability acquisition [26].
The third stream of literature has focused on the
ways in which vertical integration can influence market
power. The main argument is that vertical integration
contributes towards a firm’s ability to control market
prices by adjusting supply and demand [27] and
bargaining power by impacting price, quality and
relationships between the firm, and buyers and suppliers
[4]. Vertical integration can increase a firm’s market
power by, for instance, offsetting the bargaining power
of upstream suppliers or downstream distributors [4],
building entry and mobility barriers [27], or increasing
differentiation [16].
2.2. Industry-level factors impacting vertical
integration of digital platforms
In addition to firm-specific factors, industry
structure and characteristics (i.e. standards,
complementors and stakeholder groups), as well as
information flows, have been found to influence vertical
integration [4] also in the context of the digital platform
boundaries  [13].
Standards are technical specifications that can be
categorised in different ways [28]. Component
standards enable the same components to be reused in
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multiple products [29], while interface standards allow
compatibility and interoperability between products or
services [30]. Modularity, that is, utilizing separate
components that can be assembled and recombined to
create a new system, increases the importance of
standardization, since mapping functions to components
makes the components more reusable and less
interdependent [29]. Platforms are characterised by
modular interfaces, which enable them to reduce
coordination and transaction costs [31]. Therefore,
operating in an environment that widely utilises
standards and modular architecture may reduce the need
for vertical integration, since the interoperability of
different capabilities is more likely, even beyond a
firm’s boundaries [20]. However, in the case of systemic
innovation, which is the simultaneous adjustment of
multiple components in a system’s value chain, vertical
integration is often used to achieve control over
activities with no new standards yet in place [32].
Setting standards requires the ability to influence other
industry members, something that weaker players, such
as start-ups, rarely have [21]. Moreover, the standard-
setting ability offers control over technological
trajectories and increases the market power of the
standard-setter [12].
Relationships with complementors and other
stakeholder groups form another element of a platform’s
vertical integration strategies. A complement is a
product or service that adds value when consumed or
utilised together with another product [18]. Platforms
often use external innovators for the development and
production of complementary products, services and
technologies [33]. Thus, the question of what to acquire
from complementors and other stakeholders and what to
manage and directly control internally has proven
pivotal, both in strategic management and digital
platform literature. Related to complementors are the
different stakeholders that are interdependent on a
firm’s business [34], including suppliers, customers,
distributors and standard-setting agencies. Generally,
the presence, power and relationships among these
groups depend on industry context and structure [34],
and therefore influence platform dynamics, such as
network effects [35].
Finally, information flows across the value chain
are vital for the successful management of any firm’s
business. Lack of access to information flows leads to
information asymmetry, which occurs when two
exchange parties possess an unequal amount of
information about the product or service under
exchange, leading to uncertainty, adverse selection and
moral hazard problems [36]. Vertical integration has
been deemed as a strategy that can eliminate
inefficiencies created by information asymmetry [37].
In the context of digital platforms, different kinds of
feedback systems aim to reduce information asymmetry
by enabling the exchange of quality information [38].
These systems, which involve data and feedback flows
between the different actors residing on the platform, are
a distinctive feature of digital platforms [6].
The identified firm- and industry-level factors
served as a framework for the present empirical study of
the selected case companies.
3. Methodology
Our empirical research focused on the agricultural
industry, as it is an industry with relatively clear value
chains. Simplistically, one company produces
machinery, another provides seeds and pesticides, and a
third one buys the crops from the farmer. Second, while
the industry includes several well-known and well-
functioning companies, such as machinery
manufacturers, it has also started to attract start-ups,
highlighting the potential for innovation in the industry.
Third, agriculture is an example of a truly global
industry.
A qualitative longitudinal multiple case study
approach was adopted for the research. The corpus of
our empirical data was compiled using publicly
available sources and includes a pool of >1,100
documents, with a final sample of 403 documents. First,
company blogs and press releases were used to build an
event timeline and identify vertical integration
arrangements for all four case companies. A detailed
description of platform evolution was available due to
active self-reporting by the selected companies. Second,
independent news articles and expert blogs were
sourced from agricultural technology news aggregator
AgFunderNews, which provided us with sufficient
coverage on the selected case companies. Online blogs
and news articles have previously been used as a data
source in platform studies, as they provide researchers
with valuable perspectives from the industry followers,
as well as the people and companies involved in the
industry [8, 39]. Third, both business and academic
journals specializing in the agricultural industry were
used for triangulation and to obtain a deeper
understanding of the industry and its structure.
The selection of the case companies was based on
four criteria. First, to ensure that all selected platforms
were operating under a similar industry environment,
the sample companies were required to operate within
the U.S. agricultural industry and in a segment that
serves crop farmers. Second, both start-ups and
incumbents were included in the sample for this
research. Third, the case companies had to operate
platforms with at least two market sides. Finally, the
case companies were required to demonstrate the
successful execution of platform strategy using funding,
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installed base or reported revenue as the criteria. As a
result, two incumbents, i.e. Deere & Company (John
Deere) and Climate Corporation (CC), and two start-
ups, i.e. Indigo Ag (Indigo) and Farmers Business
Network (FBN) were selected.
John Deere CC Indigo FBN
97 150 107 73
Table 1. Number of documents per case company1
3.1. Description of the four case companies
Indigo: Founded in 2014, Indigo started as a
microbiology company that developed coated seeds to
improve yields, as well as make them survive harsher
conditions and require less water and chemicals. The
company also built a data-driven product development
process for collecting, processing and analysing
microbiology data. Building on these data capabilities,
Indigo rapidly grew into a complete end-to-end solution
provider for farmers. In 2018, Indigo launched a
platform where farmers could sell their grain directly to
food producers. It differentiated from numerous other
marketplaces by using its data capabilities to measure
farmers’ grain quality and properties, enabling them to
sell higher quality grain and special crops with a price
premium. To support the marketplace, Indigo used
vertical integration into services such as logistics
coordination, warehousing, agronomic services and
financing. In 2019, Indigo added support for
regenerative and sustainable farming practices to its
service portfolio. At the same time, it launched a carbon
marketplace to facilitate trade between farmers
sequestering carbon dioxide into their soil and
businesses aiming to offset their carbon footprint.
FBN: Established in 2014, FBN started as an
unbiased agronomic data integrator at a time when
concerns over data privacy were growing among
farmers. Unlike the other case companies, FBN avoided
investing in data capturing, instead relying on importing
data from other open platforms, and invested its
resources in building data integration, cleaning and
analysis tools. Building on these capabilities, FBN
eventually offered a similar end-to-end solution as
Indigo. In 2016, FBN developed its platform to include
the possibility to buy and sell agricultural inputs, such
as seeds, fertilizers and crop protection. Its marketplace
was unique due to its connection to farmers’ yield data,
which enabled FBN to optimise the total profits of farms
by recommending inputs with the best yield-to-price
1Some documents overlap among multiple cases.
ratio. Next, FBN used the same logic to establish a grain
marketplace. This time, compared to traditional grain
markets, the platform optimised farmers’ profits by
evaluating the total cost per transaction (e.g. production,
storage or transportation) against buyers’ bids. At the
same time, FBN introduced low-cost private-label seed
products under its brand, therefore entering its own
input marketplace as a supplier. In 2019, FBN
announced plans to build a physical retail and logistic
network to support the input marketplace and compete
against traditional retailers.
CC: Founded in 2006, CC became known for its
hyper-local weather monitoring, analytics and risk-
management products. CC now operates one of the
leading platforms in the U.S. agricultural technology
ecosystem. In 2013, American agrochemical and
agricultural biotechnology corporation Monsanto
acquired CC to combine CC’s data science capabilities
with Monsanto’s expertise in seeds and chemicals. CC,
at the time an independent subsidiary of Monsanto,
pursued vertical integration to analytics and
connectivity capabilities. It announced its open platform
strategy in 2016, which was followed by tens of
partnerships in areas of imagery, sensors, dealer
solutions, marketplaces, soil analytics, equipment
connectivity, farm management and insurance. In 2018,
a multinational pharmaceutical and chemical company,
Bayer, acquired Monsanto, and with it CC. Under the
new ownership, CC continued to develop analytical
capabilities, launching new features to support Bayer’s
agronomic input products (e.g. Seed Advisor and
disease detection).
John Deere: John Deere is an American machinery
manufacturing corporation founded in 1837 and the
producer of John Deere branded tractors, combine
harvesters, and related equipment and services. While
John Deere’s products are vital for farm operations, the
firm is only indirectly dependent on seed and grain
markets. Nevertheless, between 2010 and 2020, John
Deere developed one of the largest open platforms in the
agricultural industry and has cooperated with all the
other case companies. Building on its proprietary
sensor, connectivity and data management solutions,
John Deere launched its platform in 2012 and provided
open access for third-party developers in 2013. It further
vertically integrated into precision planting software
and hardware by acquiring Blue River Technologies in
2017. In addition, John Deere has continuously
strengthened its position in the agricultural technology
ecosystem by attracting complementors to its platform
from the fields of farm management, aerial imaging,
data analytics and marketplaces, among others.
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3.2. Data coding and analysis
The first step of our data analysis was to identify
instances of vertical integration in the collected data.
Between 2013 and 2019, the four case companies
engaged in 22 ventures and operations that were
identified as occurrences of vertical integration.
Following the guidelines of Saldana [40], during the
first coding cycle, descriptive coding was used to reflect
the set of factors identified from the literature. This type
of coding allowed for the observation of the temporal
occurrence of different factors and evaluation of the
theoretical saturation of the research data [41]. The
second coding cycle relied on pattern coding, which
aimed at observing relationships between the factors.
Following Eisenhardt [42], emerging patterns were
actively compared with extant literature. The resulting
patterns were exposed to within-case analysis to analyse
interdependencies and identify higher-level patterns.
Finally, a cross-case analysis was conducted for the
patterns with the most explanatory power.
4. Findings
The different vertical integration trajectories of the
case companies and the areas they vertically integrated
into are described in Figure 1. Although all firms started
developing their digital platforms using a similar
approach that was focused on data-based decision
support for farmers, they evolved towards two different
directions: the incumbents (CC and John Deere) built
platforms that were dependent on third party innovators,
while the start-ups (Indigo and FBN) built platforms that
focused on transactions and vertically integrated into
transaction-related services. From the data, three
vertical integration strategies were recognised among
the case companies:
1. Vertical integration from software to services
to pursue systemic innovation and increase
value for key platform users.
2. Vertical integration into data sources to gain
proprietary control of a competitive technology
and strengthen the platform’s core.
3. Vertical integration between software and
physical products in pursuit of a competitive
advantage through product development and
bundling.
Each of these is discussed separately below, with
particular focus on the corresponding industry-specific
characteristics.
4.1. Integration from software to services
All four case platforms were established in farm
and soil analytics software. However, only the start-ups
decided to vertically integrate from the software into
multiple services, such as logistics, financing and grain
testing. By contrast, the incumbents integrated into
sensor and connectivity technology. This difference in
strategy was due to the start-ups’ aim to reshape the
agricultural value chain, in order to attract users to their
platforms by creating additional value for the platform’s
Figure 1. Vertical Integration Trajectories of the Case Companies
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key users; the farmers. In particular, with this kind of
vertical integration, the platform could offer farmers
more control over their value chain, thus removing the
requirement to manage partnerships or directly engage
in vertical integration themselves.
In the traditional form of the agriculture value
chain, the value was maximised in each step of the
chain, which led to suboptimal overall results across the
value chain. For instance, buying higher performance
seeds would maximise a farm’s yield, but the higher cost
of these seeds would decrease the farm’s total net profit.
Additionally, information asymmetry is a known source
of inefficiency, an example of which is the farmers’ lack
of access to objective seed performance information.
Making the entire value chain more efficient
requires systemic innovation, including simultaneous
adjustments in different activities across multiple stages
of the value chain. This was explicitly noted by Indigo’s
CEO David Perry [43], who stated that “We have to
connect the farmer with the buyer of the crop, which
reduces some costs, but which also lets the buyer get
exactly what they want, and allows the farmer to
connect with what that buyer wants, and perhaps
produce a higher quality crop and get higher margins.
And you have to take that all the way back to the input
side, so that you can select inputs that allow farmers to
achieve that, you got to give them microbes that allow
the use of less nitrogen or fewer chemicals, and give
them data science that enables them to make better
choices on them.”
For the start-ups (Indigo and FBN), these strategic
intentions were achieved by vertically integrating from
farm and soil software into intermediation service
businesses. The start-ups aimed to act as middlemen and
manage the interoperability of areas such as grain
marketplace, logistics and grain testing by becoming
intermediaries between existing service providers and
platform users (farmers). For instance, Indigo connected
logistics providers with farmers, and the interaction was
facilitated by Indigo’s transportation service.
By contrast, both incumbents refrained from
integrating along the farmer’s value chain, despite
possessing the necessary technology capabilities and
resources. In fact, CC benefited from the existing
information and power structure by controlling a
significant market share in the agricultural input market.
For this reason, farmers expressed doubts about CC’s
potential bias in giving product or price advice. John
Deere had a strong market position in machinery and
related services, and was observed to focus only on
competing in that part of the value chain. It appeared
that incumbents were protecting the agriculture value
chain’s power and information structure, and faced
challenges when it came to engaging in similar systemic
innovation initiatives as those of start-ups.
While the benefits of systemic innovation were
universal in the agricultural industry, the findings
indicated that the difference between pursuing and not
pursuing systemic innovation could only be explained
by the background of a company, their current industry
position and the way in which systemic change would
influence the status quo.
Pursuing systemic innovation can be understood by
viewing capabilities as drivers of vertical integration
[44]. Systemic innovation requires a company to have
control over capabilities in different parts of a value
chain. By reconfiguring and linking those capabilities,
the company can innovate across the system or the value
chain. In the digital platform literature, it is often
assumed that this type of control and reconfiguration
occurs through ecosystems. Each company specialises
in a single activity in an ecosystem while aligning to
produce a uniform system [18]. Although certain
aspects of this have been observed in the agriculture
sector, the case companies discussed herein used
vertical integration to achieve the same outcome while
relying on hierarchical control. In other words, vertical
integration was used as an alternative for ecosystem
development.
The benefits obtained could be explained by the
transaction cost theory, since coordinating and
managing ecosystems could have created operational
and opportunity costs for the actors involved [45]. In a
sector like agriculture, which has established production
structures and where actors are likely to be against
changing the status quo, the cost of aligning the
ecosystem to produce systemic innovations may quickly
and markedly rise.
4.2. Integration from software to sensor,
connectivity and imaging hardware
All case companies sought to enhance their access
to data or gain a competitive advantage by controlling
proprietary data sources. What happened in practice was
that companies vertically integrated towards sensor,
connectivity and imaging technologies to control data
sources. For example, Indigo acquired a satellite
imaging start-up, CC invented a connectivity hub to
collect planting data, and John Deere acquired plant
imaging start-up Blue River.
The aim of these vertical integrations towards data
sources was to ensure the supply of data, while having
proprietary control of a capability that could potentially
improve the performance of the company’s other
activities. The importance of synergies was rather
obvious, as demonstrated by comments such as “the
new data from TellusLabs will be relevant across
business units, including helping Indigo to market its
microbial products based on a grower’s yield potential
Page 6754
and unique land characteristics” [46] and “[Blue
River’s technology] will help make all John Deere
machines smart and not just in ag [agriculture]“ [47].
While agricultural technology was a nascent market,
where particular technologies were not yet widely
available through market exchange, the existence of
such synergies provided a solid motivation to internalise
and protect an activity from competitors [4].
Vertically integrating into data sources can also be
understood from the perspective of the platform’s
position in the market and their market power [4, 27].
Standard setting and interoperability played an essential
role in technology-related vertical integration. In this
area, incumbents had control over the industry’s key
standard-setting initiatives. As a result, these standards
could be used to influence the market and competitive
dynamics in a way that was favourable for the
incumbent’s vertical scope. John Deere’s director, John
Teeple, described this in the following manner:
“[We’re] always looking to improve interoperability,
but when it comes to what we can control, we certainly
focus on our vertical integration and […] maximizing
our sources of competitive advantage [...] Where we
know that there are others in the industry that we know
are better equipped. [...] That’s where we look to
understand how we can establish international
standards” [48].
For example, increased standardisation of precision
agriculture data (intra-field crop variability information)
resulted in all case companies utilizing partnerships to
access new data sources and share data. FBN took the
most advantage of increased standardization, by relying
entirely on data exchange partnerships and avoiding
vertical integration into sensors and connectivity
hardware. The findings indicated that, as the efficiency
of partnering or using market-based exchange increased,
standardization reduced motivation for controlling
proprietary data through vertical integration. Whether
these capabilities and partnerships are available in a
specific industry is likely to be dependent on the
industry’s level of maturity, assuming that the number
of feasible partnerships increases over time [49].
Vertical integration into data sources was found to
strengthen a platform’s core capabilities, consequently
improving the quality and features of its existing
services. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of
Porter [4], it allowed platforms to differentiate their
offering through unique proprietary solutions, such as
artificial intelligence-based precision planting.
However, the use of market power to influence
standard-setting highlighted the different options
available for start-ups and incumbents.
4.3. Integration between software and physical
assets
In the agriculture value chain, physical assets
comprise an exponentially larger market than that of
information-based services. Consequently, all case
companies eventually integrated physical assets and
digital artefacts, such as software products. For
example, Indigo, FBN and CC expanded from soil
analytics to agronomic inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer
and crop protection, and John Deere from machinery to
farm management software. Two types of drivers for
this expansion were observed.
First, both start-ups mentioned gaining a
competitive advantage in product development by
creating a feedback loop between farmers and research
and development (R&D), enabling more rapid and
accurate physical product development. FBN stated that
“[Our] R&D is linked with the grower, and shows how
this product really works on real fields. And that’s
driving our ability to deliver better products” [50].
Similarly, Indigo stated that “While Indigo’s products
are physical (microbial products and coated seeds), the
core of the company has always been our computational
biology platform [...] As we and our academic
collaborators generate data from lab experiments,
greenhouse experiments, and field trials, we use these
results to refine the algorithms. Continuing to gather
commercial data from customers who are using our
products under a wide range of conditions is just a
natural extension of our approach to innovation” [51].
Both examples demonstrate the intention to
compete with increased quality achieved by gaining
access to information flows between the different stages
of the value chain and leveraging platform users as a
testing group for the product. However, utilizing this
information flow in agriculture remains challenging,
due to the high variability between different
geographical areas and the long delays between planting
the seed and receiving the results on crops. Therefore,
from the perspective of capabilities as drivers of vertical
integration [23, 24], the size of the established user base
becomes a critical capability, since an increasing
number of users enables the platform to gain enough
data for accurate R&D. Indeed, the start-ups’ success to
gain a share on a very competitive seed market
controlled by incumbents, such as CC, demonstrates the
strategic significance of using vertical integration to
establish missing feedback loops between platform
users and physical products.
Second, all case companies noted that their
software would further increase the efficiency of the
physical products, and three out of four case companies
provided their proprietary products and software
services as a bundle. At the same time, existing user
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bases can help solve some of the inherent challenges of
digital platforms, such as attracting users from different
user groups onto the platform, particularly favouring the
established user bases of the incumbent companies.
Vertical integration between software and physical
products enables companies to pursue a competitive
advantage through product development. This may get
confused with horizontal integration, where leveraging
shared development capabilities is common. However,
the integration of software and physical products creates
information feedback loops, such as product
performance data obtained from platform users,
enabling the creation of whole new data-driven R&D
processes and capabilities and going beyond simply
maximising resource usage. In that sense, the integration
of software and physical products is closely linked to a
company’s core value chains, and having control over
both becomes a source of competitive advantage [25] in
areas such as product development [18]. Furthermore,
accessing information flows allows companies to fend
off challenges that emerge from existing information
asymmetries in the industry [36].
5. Discussion
Two emerging factors characterise the vertical
integration of digital platforms. First, the vertical
integration of platforms can focus on the users’ value
chains, and second, data is a key driver of vertical
integration.
5.1. Vertical integration of the users’ value
chains
In the analysed cases, vertical integration of digital
platforms in the agricultural industry appeared to often
occur along the value chain of its key users, such as
farmers. In other words, instead of vertically integrating
solely into different parts of the platform’s value chain,
such as backend hardware, service delivery or support
functions, the studied platforms vertically integrated
into various stages of the farmers’ value chain as well.
For instance, case platforms expanded to areas such as
agronomic inputs, logistics and marketplaces, all of
which formed an integral part of the farmer’s value
chain. Control over these activities enabled platforms to
implement systemic innovations by aligning activities
across the different stages of that value chain.
Two industry-level factors facilitated vertical
integration of this type. First, while the agricultural
industry had so far been characterised by the relatively
powerful companies occupying each of the different
stages of the value chain, there had been fewer actors
looking for systemic innovation to fix inefficiencies
across the entire value chain. This industry setting
enabled start-ups to vertically integrate into the different
stages of the farmer’s value chain and control those
stages, while incumbents faced an opportunity cost of
changing the current structure.
Second, the relatively clear and focused value
chains of the industry required more coordination
between activities. In agriculture, services and products
used by farmers are naturally unique compliments, since
they depend on each other’s inputs and outputs, and the
range of services demanded is narrower than that in
consumer-oriented platforms, such as Apple’s App
Store. In this type of tightly coupled system, innovation
often requires changes across multiple activities [29].
Vertical integration appears to have been used as an
alternative for ecosystem creation, as it has enabled
companies to reap similar benefits to those linked to
ecosystems [18] while avoiding certain inconveniences,
such as transaction costs [45].
From a platform’s perspective, this type of
approach to vertical integration required the
internalization of the farmers’ role in the industry and
the application of vertical integration along the farmers’
value chain. Traditionally, the focus of vertical
integration research has been on the company’s supply
chain, such as on determining whether a manufacturing
company should also control the providers of its
components. However, in the study of vertical
integration of digital platforms, the focus should also be
on the value chains of the platform’s key users and
control of the different stages of that chain.
5.2. Data as a driver of vertical integration
Another characteristic of the vertical integration
activities of digital platforms was the role of data and
data flows across the value chain. By vertically
integrating different stages of the farmers’ value chain,
data obtained from one stage offered synergies across
other stages. As indicated in the literature, it enabled the
platforms to improve their efficiency and quality [44].
The size and activity of a platform’s installed base
are of key importance, since they translate into more, as
well as more accurate, information, eventually leading
to competitive advantages. For example, the scale and
frequency of user-sourced information enabled start-ups
to develop physical products, challenging incumbents
that relied on limited laboratory-based data collection.
In other platform markets, user-based information has
provided similar opportunities and encouraged
platforms to enter adjacent markets, indicating that
vertical integration possibilities increase as the
availability of data increases.
Thus, some of the case companies vertically
integrated into technologies enabling better data capture
Page 6756
and flow. However, other factors, such as standards, can
diminish the need for such vertical integration by
lowering transaction costs [32]. Increasing
standardization enabled platforms to access data assets
through partnerships, instead of owning the data source.
However, incumbent platforms had more control over
standard-setting organisations, which enabled them to
use standard-setting as a strategic tool.
Overall, data within and across industries provide
new opportunities for vertical integration in areas such
as sensors, connectivity, data analytics and provision of
data-driven services. For instance, obtaining data from
physical assets drives integration from software to
physical products and highlights the role of sensors and
other data sources in the equation.
6. Conclusion
The drivers of vertical integration presented in the
extant literature on traditional organizations also largely
apply to digital platforms. The agricultural value chain
context revealed integration strategies 1) towards
services and user value chains, 2) towards data sources
and platform value chains, and 3) between boundaries
of physical and digital products. The present findings
demonstrated how all three theoretical perspectives –
efficiency, capabilities and market power – were
associated with these strategies.
Two differences were observed between our
findings and those of extant literature. First, as platforms
focus on managing transactions and contributions from
third-party actors instead of on a clearly defined value
chain, vertical integration of digital platforms needs to
be evaluated from the perspective of the value chains of
the key users, not exclusively that of the platform itself.
Second, due to the digital nature of these platforms, data
generated by a platform’s users play a crucial role in the
function and expansion of the platform. Therefore,
despite the many differences between different
industries, focusing on these two factors can help
understand the paradoxical nature of vertical integration
activities in digital platforms.
The agricultural industry has certain specific
characteristics, such as the relative clarity of value
chains or established power structures, which may exist
to a lesser extent in other industries. More research is
needed, for instance, to better understand why and how
digital platforms use vertical integration strategies in
other industries. We hope that the present study provides
a starting point for such future research.
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